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J.  Adam  Carter,  Andy  Clark  &  S.  Orestis  Palermos1  
University  of  Edinburgh  
  
Abstract.   The   possibility   of   extended   cognition   invites   the   possibility   extended  
knowledge.   We   examine   what   is   minimally   required   for   such   forms   of  
technologically   extended   (and   distributed)   knowledge   to   arise   and   whether  
existing  and  future  technologies  can  allow  for  such  forms  of  epistemic  extension.  
Answering   in   the   positive,  we   explore   some   of   the   ensuing   transformations   in  
the  ethical  obligations  and  personal  rights  of  the  resulting  ‘new  humans.’          
  
1.  What  is  Extended  Cognition?  
According  to  one  traditional  conception  of  mind  and  world,  one  that  owes  primarily  to  
Descartes,   the   mind   and   its   cognitions   are   regarded   as   entirely   insulated   from   the  
external   world   which  we   aspire   to   know.  We   can   think   of   this   picture   as   one   of   an  
‘inner’  and  ‘outer’  world,  where  the  two  simply  do  not  mix.  
In  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century,  Hilary  Putnam  (1975),  Tyler  Burge  (1986)  
and  Saul  Kripke  (1980)  highlighted  one  important  reason  why  this  segregated  picture  of  
cognition   and   world   can’t   be   right.   Under   the   banner   of   content   externalism   these  
philosophers  established  a  point  now  widely  taken  for  granted,  which  is  that  what  one  
counts  as  thinking  about—that  is,  the  content  of  the  thought  you  are  currently  having—
                                                
1  Author  names  appear  in  alphabetical  order.    
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is   at   least   partly   a   matter   of   your   physical   or   social   environment,   and   thus   can’t   be  
entirely  a  matter  of  how  things  stand  internal  to  you.  
While  allowing  the  world  to  play  a  role  in  individuating  mental  content  represents  
one  form  of  resistance  to  the  mind/world  boundary,  a  much  more  provocative  form  of  
resistance   emerges   from   a   recent   strand   of   thinking   in   the   philosophy   of   mind   and  
cognitive  science.  This  strand  of  thinking,  which  has  become  known  under  the  banner  
of  the  ‘extended  mind’  depicts  certain  forms  of  human  cognizing  as  inhering  in  complex  
tangles  of  feedback,  feed-­‐‑forward  and  feed-­‐‑around  loops  that  promiscuously  criss-­‐‑cross  
the  boundaries  of  brain,  body  and  world  (see  Clark  and  Chalmers  1998;  Clark  2008;  and  
essays  in  Menary  2010).  
To   make   this   idea   more   concrete,   suppose   you—perhaps,   in   order   to   guard  
against  the  early  onset  of  Alzheimer’s—begin  relying  on  a  user-­‐‑friendly  note-­‐‑taking  app  
on  your   smartphone   for   information  encoding,   storage  and   retrieval.  When  you   learn  
something   new,   you   record   it   in   the   ‘memory   app’;  when   you   need   old   information,  
you  automatically  and  unreflectively  access  the  app.  We  can  make  this  story  subtler  and  
more  powerful  by  adding  further  capabilities   to   the  app.  Every   time  you   look  up  one  
entry,   the   app  now   suggests   similar   or   related   information  you  might  want   to   take   a  
look  at.  The  entries  that  have  not  been  used  for  a  long  time  fade  out  from  the  suggested  
list,  and  the  ones  that  are  most  commonly  invoked  appear  on  the  top.  Perhaps  the  app  
can  even  track  your  current  location  and  automatically  project  previous  entries  related  
to   that   location   or   the   type   of   event   you   are   attending.   The   app   also   automatically  
creates   connections   between   the   various   entries:   connections   that,   subject   to   the  
frequency  they  are  being  followed,  get  stronger  or  weaker.  In  fact,  all  this  may  soon  be  
possible   given   the   advent   of   the   Semantic  Web   (Berners-­‐‑Lee   et   al.,   2001).   Over   time,  
relying  on  the  super-­‐‑app  becomes  automatic  and  second  nature  to  you.  The  app  has  in  
effect   started   playing   the   functional   role   of   information   encoding,   storage   and  
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automatic  when-­‐‑needed  retrieval.  This   is  strongly  reminiscent  of  at   least  some  aspects  
of  the  functional  role  ordinarily  played  by  biological  memory.  
Given   such   a   well-­‐‑integrated   functional   role,   why   insist   that   all   your   ‘real’  
memory  is  in  your  head?  There  comes  a  point,  Clark  and  Chalmers  argue,  where  simply  
insisting  that  all  processes  of  real  human  memory  play  out  entirely  within  skin  and  skull  
looks   like  an  unprincipled  kind  of   ‘bioprejudice’.  Proponents  of  extended  cognition   think  
we   should   shun   bioprejudice   for   a   more   egalitarian   approach   to   thinking   about   our  
mental   lives.   To   drive   this   home,   Clark   and   Chalmers   suggested   a   so-­‐‑called   ‘parity  
principle’—viz.,  a  rule  of  thumb  that  states  that:  
Parity  principle:   If,   as  we   confront   some   task,   a  part  of   the  world   functions  as  a  
process   which,   were   it   to   go   on   in   the   head,   we   would   have   no   hesitation   in  
accepting  as  part  of   the  cognitive  process,   then  that  part  of   the  world   is  part  of  
the  cognitive  process.  Clark  and  Chalmers  (1998,  8).    
Clark  and  Chalmers’  claim  is   thus  that  when  we  think  about   ‘the  mind’  we  are  
often  over-­‐‑impressed  by  the  ancient  boundaries  of  skin  and  skull.   Just  as  our  physical  
capacities   can   be   repaired,   augmented,   and   transformed   by   new   non-­‐‑biological   tools  
and  technologies,  so  (the  ‘extended  mind’  story  claims)  can  our  mental  capacities.  
  
2.  A  Puzzle  for  Extended  Knowers  
In   one  way,   all   this   can   seem  blindingly   obvious.  We  use   calculators,   notebooks   and  
iPads,  and  clearly  we  can  do  more  search,  reasoning,  recall  and  calculation  as  a  result.  
But   in   some   cases   we   have   the   intuition   that   it   is   YOU,   the   agent,   that   has   been  
enhanced,   augmented,  or   extended,  while   in  other   cases   it   seems  more   like  YOU,   the  
agent,   are   accessing   or   deploying   some   additional,   external,   resource.   Call   these   the  
‘extended’  versus  ‘merely  tool-­‐‑like’  cases  respectively.  Classic  cyborgs,  like  Terminator  
and  Robocop,  fall  clearly  on  the  extended  side  of  this  divide.  For  the  classic  cyborg,  the  
implanted  technology  helps  make  them  the  specific  agent  that  they  are.  Old-­‐‑fashioned  
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VCR  remote  controllers,  on  the  other  hand,   leave  the  VCR  clearly  on  the  other  side  of  
the   agent-­‐‑world   divide.   These   are   intuitively   best   seen   as   (rather   hard   to   use)   tools  
rather   than   true   user-­‐‑augmentations.   But   the  moral   of   the   extended  mind   arguments  
(see   also   Clark   (2003))   is   that   the   difference   between   ‘merely   tool-­‐‑like’   and   agent-­‐‑
extending  technologies  does  not  require  mind-­‐‑extending  stuff  to  be  wired  directly  to  the  
brain,   or   even   to   be  permanently   attached   to,   or   implanted   in,   the   body.   Instead,   the  
claim   is   that   if   some   additional   non-­‐‑biological   resource   is   generally   available   when  
needed,   fluently   (and  pretty  much  automatically)  deployed,  and  mostly  unreflectively  
trusted  in  what  it  delivers,  then  it  already  shares  much  of  the  bedrock  functional  profile  
of  your  native  mental  resources  (see  Clark  &  Chalmers  1998).  
Those   demands   (availability,   fluency,   and   trust)   are  meant   to   evoke   a   familiar  
profile.  After  all,  we  don’t  (mostly)  stop  and  think  “Hmm,  that  might  be  stored  in  my  
bio-­‐‑memory…”   then   retrieve   the   info   and   carefully   check   it.   Instead,   bio-­‐‑memory   is  
(mostly)  there  when  needed,  and  we  just  rely  on  it  as  we  engage  in  a  task.  Truly  mind-­‐‑
extending/cyborg   technologies,   Clark   and   Chalmers   argue,   need   to   be   invoked   and  
relied  upon   just  as  easily  and  unreflectively  as  we  invoke  and  rely  upon  bio-­‐‑memory,  
bio-­‐‑reasoning,   and   bio-­‐‑sensing.   Similarly,   a   tennis   racquet,   in   fluent   use,   gets   folded  
right  into  the  flow  of  sensing  and  acting,  so  that  when  we  encounter  the  ‘tennis  world’  
we  do  so  with  the  racquet  playing  a  role  more  like  that  of  a  temporary  body-­‐‑part  than  
that  of  an  encountered  tool  or  object.  
But   all   this   has   an   interesting   consequence.   It  means   that   in   normal   operation,  
mind-­‐‑extending   tools   should   seek   to   by-­‐‑pass   the   epistemic   gatekeepers   of   deliberate,  
conscious,   slow,   careful,   agentive   attention.   The   best   new-­‐‑you-­‐‑bits   need   to   join   the  
‘cognitive   party’  without   being   constantly   stopped   at   the   sensory   gates   and   asked   to  
show  their  invitations  and  IDs!  This  poses  a  puzzle.  For  it  means  that  the  best  cognitive  
extensions  will  be,  prima   facie,   among   the  worst   cases  of  augmentations  apt   to  deliver  
genuine   knowledge   This   is   a   significant   threat   that   can   emerge   from   a   number   of  
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approaches   to   knowledge   that   put   forward   some   form   of   ‘awareness   condition’   on  
justification.          
Take   for   example   the   standard   epistemic   internalist   approach,2  according   to  
which  one  should  always  be  able,  at  least  in  principle,  to  access  the  reasons  that  justify  
one’s  beliefs,  by  reflection  alone.3  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  such  an  approach  to  knowledge  
could  line  up  with  the  possibility  of  knowledge  produced  on  the  basis  of  an  extended  
cognitive   process.   If   knowledge   requires   the   ability   to   reflectively   (i.e.,   consciously)  
access   the   reasons   that   support   one’s   beliefs,   then   it   seems   highly   unlikely   that   one  
could   count   as   knowing   a   piece   of   information,   which   is   unreflectively   trusted   and  
which  has  been  automatically  retrieved.4  Or  consider  a  strong  version  of  the  externalist  
approach   of   virtue   reliabilism   (Pritchard   2010),   according   to  which   the   agent  must   be  
primarily  creditable  with  the  cognitive  success  of  believing  the  truth.  What  that  involves  
is  not  merely   that   the  new-­‐‑found   capacity  be   reliable,   simply  as   a  matter  of   fact.  The  
new  capacity  needs   to  be,   in   some   intuitive  but   surprisingly  elusive   sense,  her  own.   It  
needs   to   be   primarily   creditable   to   her   (cognitive)   agency.   One   way   in   which   this  
requirement  is  standardly  met  is  by  insisting  that  the  agent  be  aware  of  the  source  of  the  
reliability   of   her   new   ability.   Once   again,   however,   the   problem   is   that   such   a  
requirement   stands   in   immediate   tension  with   the   suggestion,   in   the   literature  on   the  
‘extended   mind’,   that   true   cognitive   extensions   function   automatically   and   (where  
possible)   below   the   level   of   active   agential   scrutiny.   Clark   (2015)   presents   this   as   a  
dilemma,  which  we  shall  label  the  Epistemic  Hygiene  Dilemma:  
                                                
2 For an overview of this position and its key contrast points with epistemic externalism, see Pappas 
(2014). 
3 For classical defenses of this view see Chisholm (1977) and BonJour (1985, Chap. 2). See also Steup 
(1999), Pryor (2001, p. 3), BonJour (2002), Pappas (2014), and Poston (2008). 
4 For a recent argument in favour of the compatibility of epistemic externalism and the extended mind, 
see Carter and Palermos (2016). Cf., Smithies (2017, this volume) for a different perspective. 
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Epistemic   Hygiene   Dilemma.   Either   the   agent   consciously   encounters   some   new  
resource  as  an  ongoing  object  for  various  forms  of  epistemically  hygienic  practice  
(such  as  understanding  why  it   is  a  reliable  source  of   information)  or  not.   If  she  
does,  this  makes  the  resource  look,  at  that  moment,  more  like  external  equipment  
(it  may   then  be  a   source  of  knowledge  while   failing   to  be  part  of  HER).      If   she  
doesn’t,   it   looks   unable   (from   the   perspective   of   theories   of   knowledge   that  
subscribe  to  some  form  of  ‘awareness  condition’)  to  act  as  a  source  of  knowledge.  
3.  Assessing  the  Damage  
How  damaging  is  this  to  the  case  for  extended  knowing?  A  tempting  move  is  to  dismiss  
the  worry  as  one  that  would  equally  well  apply  to  the  very  best  biological  cases—a  kind  
of   reductio   of   the   ‘awareness   condition’.   After   all,   I   may   surely   rely   on   operations  
provided  by  a  pocket  calculator  as  a  source  of  mathematical  knowledge  even  without  
knowing   how   the   calculator   works.   And   were   such   a   device   to   become   fluently  
assimilated  into  my  daily  routines,  deployed  unreflectively  and  automatically  when  the  
task   demands   it,   that   does   not   obviously   change   that   situation   in   any  material   way.  
Such   cases   (seen   from   the   perspective   of   a   suitably   weakened   form   of   virtue  
epistemology5)  may   instead   involve   a   kind   of   socially   embedded   epistemic   vigilance.  
Some  folk  know  how  these  things  work,  after  all.    
Unfortunately,   however,   many   of   the   most   powerful   near-­‐‑future   tools   and  
technologies  will  rely  on  stuff  that  nobody  fully  understands.  A  timely  example  concerns  
the   use   of   so-­‐‑called   ‘deep   architectures’—viz.,   multi-­‐‑level   artificial   neural   networks  
used   to   discover   (via   ‘deep   learning’)   patterns   in   large   data-­‐‑sets   such   as   images   and  
texts.  The  power  and  prevalence  of  these  deep  architectures  masks  a  major  problem—
the  problem  of  knowledge-­‐‑opacity.  Such  architectures   learn   to  do  wonderful   things,  but  
they  do  not  (without  further  coaxing)  reveal   just  what  they  are   ‘thinking  about’  when  
they  do  them.    
                                                
5 See, for example, Pritchard (2010). 
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A  stark  example  of  the  limits  of  our  understanding  was  the  recent  discovery  that  
trained-­‐‑up   networks   systematically   admit   of   so-­‐‑called   ‘adversarial   exemplars’.   Thus  
suppose   a  net   has   learnt   to   classify   images   as   cars   or   as   not-­‐‑cars.   In   a  piece  with   the  
understated  title  of  ‘Intriguing  properties  of  neural  networks’,  Christian  Szegedy  et  al.  
(2013)   showed   how   to   generate   (reliably   and   systematically)   very   subtly   deformed  
‘adversarial’   versions   of   images   that   the   net   would   easily   classify   correctly.   These  
adversarial   versions   involve   small   pixel-­‐‑level   perturbations   that   are   invisible   to   the  
human   eye,   so   the   adversarial   exemplar   looks,   to   us,   like   an   identical   image.  Yet   the  
network  gets  them  totally  wrong.  Just  examining  the  networks  normal  behavior  would  
have   led   us   to   conclude   that   it   knew   what   cars   looked   like   in   general—and   no-­‐‑one  
would  predict   that   a  visually   indistinguishable  version  of   a  photo   easily   classified  by  
humans  as  a  car  would  be  so  challenging  as  to  defeat  the  network.  
The  good  news  is  that  networks  can  then  be  trained  on  adversarial  examples  to  
help   combat   those   blind   spots.   But   the   larger   moral   is   that   deep   nets   learn   ways   of  
solving   problems   that   are   opaque   to   their   human   developers.   This   has   been   a   long-­‐‑
standing  problem  for  multi-­‐‑level  networks.  But  as  the  tide  of  deep  learning  advances,  it  
is  one  we  can  no  longer  afford  to  ignore.  Deep  learning  and  the  patterns  it  extracts  will  
soon   permeate   every   aspect   of   our   daily   lives,   from   online   search,   to   online  
recommendation  systems,  to  bank-­‐‑loan  applications,  healthcare  and  dating.  Appeals  to  
socially  distributed   forms  of  epistemic  virtue  will  not   save  near-­‐‑future  augmentations  
that  exploit  these  kinds  of  algorithms  from  the  dilemma  of  epistemic  hygiene.    
Another  attempt  to  limit  the  damage  immediately  suggests  itself.  For  plausibly,  
we  do  not  know  our  own  biological  capacities  any  better  than  we  know  the  new  deep  
learning   capacities   just   described.   But   our   senses   can  deliver   knowledge  despite   this.  
Yet   with   bio-­‐‑sensing   (sight,   hearing,   etc.)   we   at   least   have   some   good   background  
reasons   for   trust.   For   one   thing,   we   have   the   long   history   of   evolutionary   ‘test’.   In  
addition,  we  have  our  own  extensive   ‘user-­‐‑experience’,  honed  during  slow  childhood  
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acclimatization.  Most   recently,  we  benefit   from  hundreds  of  years  of   careful   scientific  
probing   and   research   (revealing   e.g.,   cognitive   biases,   and   our   proneness   to   certain  
illusions).  But  here  too,  the  new  technologies  score  rather  badly.  For  the  ever-­‐‑changing  
suite  of  apps   that  might  help  constitute  a  cognitively  extended   ‘new  human’  we  have  
maybe   a   year   or   two   of   software   development,   a   few   beta-­‐‑testers,   and   the   (quasi-­‐‑
‘evolutionary’)  credentials  of  being  made  by  Google,  Microsoft,  or  Apple.  This  should  
be  worrying.  Moreover,  and  fully  in  line  with  the  basic  tenets  of  extended  cognition,  the  
best  personal  upgrades  will  be  readily  poised  for  fast  fluent  assimilation  into  our  daily  
routines.  They  will  be  upgrades  designed  in  ways  that  increasingly  preclude  reflective  
attention  and  interrogation  on  the  part  of  the  newly  enhanced  agent.  No-­‐‑one  wants  to  
have  to  learn  to  use  a  new  app.  They  just  want  it  to  work.  
So  far,  then,  the  dilemma  of  epistemic  hygiene  is  not  resolved.  The  best  cyborg/  
extended-­‐‑mind   technologies   will   not   lend   themselves   to   ‘proper   epistemic   care   and  
vigilance’   on   the   part   of   the   agent.   They   are   designed   for   rapid   assimilation,   not   to  
present  themselves  as  objects  of  concern.  And  the  factors  that  may  mitigate  this  worry  
in   other   cases   do   not   seem   to   get   an   equal   foothold   with   respect   to   ill-­‐‑understood  
human-­‐‑built   technologies.   How,   then,   are   we   to   become   epistemically   responsible  
cyborgs?    
  
4.  A  minimalist  approach  to  epistemic  hygiene  
To   answer   this   question,   we   can   focus   on   a   recent   virtue   reliabilist   proposal   that  
construes  epistemic  responsibility  and  agency  in  a  rather  weak  fashion.6  We  previously  
noted   that   a   number   of   epistemological   proposals   regard   epistemic   justification   as  
involving  the  ability  to  provide  explicit  positive  reasons  in  support  of  our  beliefs  or  in  
support  of  the  reliability  of  our  belief-­‐‑forming  processes  (i.e.,  what  we  previously  called  
                                                
6 For some notable defences of virtue reliabilism in epistemology, see, for example, Sosa 1988; 1993; 2007;  
2015; Greco 1999; 2010. 
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the  ‘awareness  condition’).  While  this  is  an  intuitive  way  to  think  about  justification,  the  
problem  is  that  there  are  several  belief-­‐‑forming  processes,  such  as  biological  vision  and  
bio-­‐‑memory,   which   are   supposed   to   be   knowledge-­‐‑conducive,   even   though   most  
epistemic   agents  have  no   idea  how   they  work  or  why   they   are   reliable.  Accordingly,  
when  we  acquire  knowledge  on  their  basis,  it  seems  incorrect  to  require  explicit  positive  
reasons   in   their   support.   To   solve   this   long   standing   problem,   a   few   epistemologists  
have   recently   suggested   that   we   should   give   up   the   aforementioned   strong  
understanding  of  justification,  according  to  which  one  should  be  able  to  provide  explicit  
positive  reasons  in  support  of  one’s  beliefs,  and  instead  embrace  one  of  several  weaker  
alternative  visions.7    
According  to  one  prominent  weaker  alternative,  in  order  for  one’s  true  beliefs  to  
qualify  as  knowledge,  they  must  simply  be  the  product  of  a  belief-­‐‑forming  process  that  
counts  as  a  cognitive  ability.  This   is  known  as   the  ability   intuition  on  knowledge  and   its  
intuitive   appeal   comes   from   the   fact   that   cognitive   abilities  do   seem   to   be   the   sort   of  
belief-­‐‑forming   processes   that   can   generate   knowledge,   even   if   one   has   no   explicit  
positive  reasons  to  offer  in  their  support.8  No  one  needs  to  explain  why  their  vision  or  
hearing  is  reliable  when  they  come  to  acquire  knowledge  on  their  basis,  after  all.    
But  if  this  is  the  way  to  approach  knowledge  and  justification,  there  are  at  least  
two  more  central  questions  that  we  need  to  further  ask:  (1)  When  does  a  process  count  
as  a  cognitive  ability  belonging  to  a  certain  agent  and  thereby  as  knowledge  conducive,  
and—depending   on   how  we   answer   (1)—(2)   what   is   the   sense   in   which   one   can   be  
justified   on   the   basis   of   one’s   cognitive   abilities   in   a   way   that   does   not   involve   the  
possession  of  explicit  reasons  in  their  support?  
                                                
7 See, for example, Huemer (2007), Burge (1993), Pryor (2004), etc. 
8 The idea that knowledge must be grounded in cognitive abilities can be traced back to the writings of 
(Sosa 1988, 1993) and Plantinga (1993a, 1993b). For more recent approaches to this intuition, see Greco 
(1999; 2004; 2007; 2010) and Pritchard (2009, 2010, 2012). 
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In  order   to   answer   the   first   question,   John  Greco   (e.g.,   1999;   2010;   2012)   insists  
that   in   order   for   a   process   to   count   as   a   cognitive   ability,   it   must   have   been  
appropriately  integrated  into  the  agent’s  cognitive  character,  which  he  defines  as  the  set  
of   ‘acquired   skills   of   perception   and   acquired   methods   of   inquiry   including   those  
involving   highly   specialized   training   or   even   advanced   technology’   (1999,   287).   But  
what  exactly  is  required  in  order  for  a  process  to  be  so  integrated?    
As   far  as  common-­‐‑sense   intuitions  are  concerned,  Greco   (1999,  2010)  has  noted  
that   the   relevant   belief-­‐‑forming   process   must   be   neither   strange   nor   fleeting9  (i.e.,   it  
must  be  a  normal,  dispositional  cognitive  process).  Nevertheless,   in   later  work   (2010),  
Greco’s  explanatory  focus  shifts  away  from  such  broad  intuitions  and  towards  a  more  
mechanistic  understanding  of  cognitive  integration  that  centers  around  the  cooperative  
interaction  between  the  relevant  process  and  the  rest  of  the  agent’s  cognitive  character.  
Specifically,   he   writes:   ‘cognitive   integration   is   a   function   of   cooperation   and  
interaction,  or  cooperative  interaction  with  other  aspects  of  the  cognitive  system’  (2010,  
152).    
What   might   be   the   reason   that   Greco   spells   out   ‘cognitive   integration’   and  
‘cognitive  character’  in  this  alternative  way?  The  answer,  Palermos  (2014)  suggests,  has  
to  do  with  a  minimal  notion  of  epistemic  agency  and  responsibility.  Greco  is  after  a  notion  of  
subjective  justification/epistemic  responsibility  that  is  in  line  with  epistemic  externalism  
in   that   it  denies   that   in  order   to  be  subjectively   justified/epistemically  responsible  one  
needs  to  have  access  to  or  be  aware  of  the  reasons  for  which  one’s  beliefs  are  reliable.  
Accentuating   the   integrated  nature   of   one’s   cognitive   character   allows   for   just   this:   If  
one’s   belief-­‐‑forming   process   cooperatively   interacts   with   other   aspects   of   one’s  
cognitive  system,  then  it  can  be  continuously  monitored  in  the  background  such  that   if  
                                                
9 This caveat was added in part as a way to defend against certain ‘meta-incoherence’ style cases, such as 
Alvin Plantinga’s (1993a) ‘brain lesion case’, where an individual’s brain lesion causes her to reliably 
believe she has a brain lesion, though the individual is unaware of the source of the belief.  
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there  is  something  wrong  with  it,  then  the  agent  will  be  able  to  notice  this  and,  if  she  or  
he  is  so  inclined,  respond  appropriately.  Otherwise—if  the  agent  has  no  negative  beliefs  
about  his/her  belief-­‐‑forming  process—he/she  can  be  subjectively  justified  in  employing  
the   relevant   process   by   default,   even   if   he/she   has   absolutely   no   positive   beliefs   as   to  
whether  or  why  it  might  be  reliable.    
On  this  version  of  virtue  reliabilism,  provided  that  (1)  the  agent’s  belief-­‐‑forming  
process  is  integrated  to  his/her  cognitive  character  by  being  continuously  monitored  by  
(or  interacting  with)  the  rest  of  the  cognitive  system,  and  (2)  the  agent  is  conscientious  
(i.e.,  motivated   to   believe  what   is   true)   such   that   he/she  would   indeed  be   responsive  
were  he/she   to  become  aware   that   there   is   something  wrong  with  his/her  process,   then  
the  agent  can  be  subjectively  justified  in  holding  the  resulting  beliefs  merely  by  lacking  
any  negative  reasons  against  them.  
  
4.1  How  minimalist?  
According  to  this  weaker  approach  to  justification,  in  order  to  be  justified,  one  does  not  
need  to  be  aware  of  the  source  of  the  reliability  of  her  beliefs.  Instead,  one  need  only  be  
in  a  position  to  become  aware  (in  the  relevant  counterfactual  circumstances)  that  his/her  
beliefs  are  unreliably   formed  and  then  respond  appropriately.  But  even   this,   it   can  be  
argued,  is  requiring  too  much  by  way  of  active  agentive  involvement.    
   According  to  the  picture  developed  above,  even  though  the  agent  does  not  need  
to  be  aware  of  any  explicit  positive   reasons   in  support  of  his/her  beliefs,   she  should  at  
least  be  able  to  become  aware  of  any  telltale  signs  of  unreliability  of  the  relevant  process  
or   the   resulting  beliefs.  But  drawing  on   recent   cognitive   scientific  work   in   the  area  of  
‘predictive  processing’  and  the  ‘Bayesian  brain’,  Clark  (2015)  argues  that  an  agent  may  
still  be  epistemically  responsive  even  if  he/she  never  becomes  consciously  aware  of  any  
signs   of   unreliability.   For   example,   driving   on   a   foggy   day,   our   sensory   processing  
systems   may   automatically   decrease   the   weight   assigned   to   visual   cues,   while  
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increasing   that   assigned   to   prior   knowledge   of   the   road,   auditory   signals,   etc.  
Conversely,   on   a   clear   and   sunny   day,   our   predictive   brain   increases   the   weight  
assigned   to   the   incoming   visual   information.   Crucially,   in   both   cases,   the   ‘Bayesian’  
predictive  brain  does  so  automatically,  with  no  conscious  decision  required  on  the  part  
of   the  agent.   In   the  class  of  models  Clark  considers,   these  adjustments  emerge   from  a  
process  that  continuously  estimates  the  reliability  or  unreliability,  in  context,  of  specific  
beliefs   and   sources   of   information.  Crucially,   these   estimations   are  part-­‐‑and-­‐‑parcel   of  
the  process  of  using  incoming  sensory  information  to  perceive  and  act  in  the  world,  and  
can   take   place   without   any   form   of   conscious   awareness   of   the   altered   balances   of  
power  (e.g.,  between  visual  and  auditory  information,  or  between  sensory  evidence  and  
top-­‐‑down  prediction)  involved.  
This  is  not  to  claim  that  the  ability  to  become  aware  of  these  patterns  of  reliability  
and  unreliability  plays  no  role  in  the  process  of  acquiring  knowledge.  Instead,  the  claim  
is   that   these  kinds  of  sub-­‐‑personal  goings-­‐‑on  already  satisfy  minimal  requirements  on  
the   epistemically   sound   (and   hence   agent-­‐‑creditable)   deployment   of   knowledge   and  
evidence.10    
But  what   about   cases  where  we   seem   to   lack   sufficient   information   to  make   a  
choice,  or  perform  an  action,  at  all?    Sub-­‐‑personal  forms  of  epistemic  ‘balancing’  might  
be   good   for   automatically   adjusting   the   reliability   of   our   belief-­‐‑forming   processes   so  
that  they  can  pass  the  most  minimal  threshold  for  knowledge.11  Nevertheless,    an  agent  
that   is   capable   of   conscious   awareness   can  go   further.   She   can   actively  decide   to  pay  
greater  attention  to  a  tricky  epistemic  task,  or  decide  that  her  grip  on  the  situation  is  just  
too  frail  to  be  allowed  to  select  any  positive  action  at  all—for  example,  parking  her  car  
                                                
10 How can something be credited to the agent if the agent need not ‘do it’ (even counterfactually)? The 
suggestion is that these capacities of sub-personal self-correction partially define the agent as the agent 
she is. I can be credited with them in the same way as I can be credited with having a certain bedrock 
temperament, or tendency to embrace or avoid risk. 
11 Compare with Sosa’s (2015, Ch. 3, e.g., 76) notion of ‘subcredal animal knowledge’. 
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by  the  roadside  until  the  fog  clears.  Notably,  conscious,  thoughtful  reflection  on  the  part  
of  the  agent  is  not  obviously  necessary  to  make  such  choices;12  For  example,  non-­‐‑human  
animals  may  automatically  estimate  that  they  have  insufficient  information  to  proceed  
with   a   pounce-­‐‑attack.   Nonetheless,   being   capable   of   being   consciously   aware   of   the  
reliability  (or  at  least  unreliability)  of  one’s  cognitive  capacities  is  not  the  same  and  it  is  
not  as  epistemically  demanding  as  being  capable  of  human-­‐‑level,  reflectively  thoughtful  
deliberations.    
Our  human  capacities  for  reflection  are  admittedly  causally  potent,  and  enable  us  
to  exert  caution  in  a  much  wider  range  of  circumstances,  drawing  on  shared  knowledge  
of  past  outcomes,  and  complex   imaginative  simulations  of  possible   future  unfoldings.  
An  additional  role  for  conscious  thoughtful  awareness,  Clark  (2015)  suggests,  emerges  
not   during   the   process   of   forming   our   beliefs,   but   during   the   process   of   building   our  
belief-­‐‑forming   processes:   ‘consciousness   is   a   necessary   condition   of   a   form   of   self-­‐‑
alienation—a   form   of   self-­‐‑alienation   that   opens   up   the   space   for   all   these   more  
deliberate  forms  of  epistemic  engineering’  (2015,  3773).  It  allows  us  to  treat  our  thought  
processes  as  objects  of  other  ongoing  thought  processes  with  the  attendant  potential  to  
refine  and  develop  them  in  ways  that  would  perhaps  be  unavailable  in  the  absence  of  
conscious   awareness.   ‘There   is   a   close   analogue   in   sports   skills,  where  only   reflective  
agents  can  ask  what  aspect  of  their  golf  swing  (for  example)  was  at  fault  when  the  ball  
lands  in  the  rough’,  (Ibid.,  3773).    
A   minimalist   approach   to   epistemic   hygiene   could   therefore   suggest   that  
conscious   agentive   control   of   our   beliefs   may   come   synchronically   (by   being   in   a  
position   to   become   aware   of   any   potential   faults   with   our   beliefs   as   they   are   being  
formed),   diachronically   (by   having   been   previously   involved   in   the   shaping   of   the  
                                                
12 Of course, sometimes due to practical considerations, we are forced to act even on the basis of 
impoverished evidence. Even in such cases, epistemic hygiene can be better or worse. For discussion on 
such cases of ‘virtuous guessing’ see Carter, Jarvis and Rubin (Forthcoming) and Carter (Forthcoming). 
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belief-­‐‑forming  processes  that  automatically  generate  our  beliefs  in  the  here-­‐‑and-­‐‑now)  or  
even   both.   Admittedly,   intuition   can   cut   both   ways.   But   all   these   approaches   to  
minimalist  epistemic  hygiene  share  the  following  commitment:  In  order  for  the  agent  to  
count  as   epistemically   responsible,  what   is  minimally   required   is   responsiveness   to   the  
contextual  reliability  or  unreliability  of  the  relevant  belief-­‐‑forming  processes.  So  long  as  
the   agent   can   respond   to   the   potential   unreliability   of   her   belief   forming   processes  
(independent  of  whether  such  responsiveness  involves  conscious  awareness  at  the  time  
of  belief   formation),   the  agent  can  come  to  acquire  knowledge.  This  will  be  so  even   if  
he/she   lacks  any  positive   reasons   to  offer   in   support  of   the   reliability  of  his/her  belief  
forming  process.  On  both  approaches,   this   responsiveness  arises  out  of   the   integrated  
nature  of  the  agent’s  cognitive  system,  and  as  such  it  is  a  form  of  responsibility  that  can  
be   properly   ascribed   to   her—it   is   that   agent’s   responsibility   as   it   arises   out   of   the  
interconnectedness  of  that  agent’s  cognitive  system  as  a  whole.    
  
4.2  Subliminal  Belief-­‐‑Forming  Processes,  Extended  
It  is  therefore  possible  to  understand  epistemic  agency  and  responsibility  in  a  way  that  
allows  one  to  acquire  knowledge  on  the  basis  of  belief-­‐‑forming  processes  such  as  vision,  
memory  and  hearing,  even  if  one  could  have  never  become  aware  of  any  non-­‐‑circular,  
explicit   reasons   to   offer   in   their   support.   With   regards   to   the   dilemma   of   epistemic  
hygiene,   this   approach   to   epistemic   agency   and   responsibility   seems   to   allow   for   the  
acquisition  of  knowledge  on  the  basis  of  a  belief-­‐‑forming  process  that  is  extended,  even  
if   the  relevant  extended  process   is  automatically  deployed,  unreflectively   trusted  and,  
on  the  whole,  operates  subliminally  in  a  way  that  parallels  the  functioning  of  most  of  our  
biological  cognitive  resources.   In  fact,   there  are  some  interesting  parallels  between  the  
way   epistemology   approaches   the   idea   of   cognitive   integration   and   the   literature   on  
extended  cognition.    
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Arguments   for   extended   cognition   do   not   always   rest   on   the   commonsensical  
intuitions   that   we   considered   in   §1—i.e.,   the   fluency,   automaticity   and   unreflective  
reliance   of   the   agent   on   the   external   resources.   Instead,   a   number   of   theorists   have  
recently  suggested  focusing  on  the  details  of  Dynamical  Systems  Theory  (DST)   (Clark  
and  Chalmers  1998;  Chemero  2009;  Froese  et  al.  2013;  Palermos  2014).    
Dynamical   Systems   Theory   (DST)   is   a   successful   and   widely   used   branch   of  
theoretical   mathematics   that   deals   with   the   study   of   systems   that   change   over   time.  
According   to  DST,  whenever  some  process   is  performed  by   two  or  more  components  
that   interact  reciprocally  with  each  other,  so  that   (for  example)  component  one  causes  
changes   in   component   two,  while   component   two   causes   changes   in   component   one,  
the   resulting  behavior   can  be   fruitfully  described   as   arising  within   a   single   (coupled)  
system.     Many   instances   of   current   or   near-­‐‑future   cognitive   technologies  will   display  
just  such  a  profile.  This  provides  further  reason  to  analyse  such  cases  by  identifying  an  
extended   cognitive   system   that   comprises   the   biological   agent   along   with   all   such  
properly  coupled  elements.  Such  couplings  may  also  characterize  a  range  of  other  cases,  
including  the  use  of  Tactile  Visual  Sensory  Substitutions  Systems),13  and  cases  in  which  
two   or   more   agents   collaboratively   perform   a   cognitive   task,   such   as   performing   a  
scientific   experiment.   This   latter   possibility—known   as   distributed   cognition14—may  
sound   even   more   radical   than   the   possibility   of   cognitive   extension,   but   the   only  
difference  is  that,  this  time,  the  extended  cognitive  system  putatively  extends  to  include  
not  only  artifacts  but  other  biological  agents  as  well.    
Given  this  understanding  of  extended  and  distributed  cognition  as  arising  out  of  
the  synergetic  operation  of  two  or  more  coupled  components  and  the  fact  that  a  similar  
ongoing  interdependence  is  required  between  the  components  of  a  cognitive  system  to  
                                                
13 See Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003) for a recent review on TVSS. 
14 Hutchins 1995, Sutton, 2008; Sutton et. al, 2008; Theiner et al., 2010; Theiner and Goldstone, 2010; Palermos 
Forthcominga.  
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count  as  knowledge-­‐‑conducive,   it  seems  that  we  have  an  approach  to  knowledge  and  
justification   that   allows   for   the   acquisition   of   knowledge   on   the   basis   of   not   only  
subliminal   biological   cognitive   processes,   but   also   subliminal   processes   that   are  
technologically   extended   or   even   distributed   (we   return   to   this   latter   possibility   in  
section  5.3).  On  this  view,  an  extended  belief-­‐‑forming  process  may  belong  to  an  agent  S  
who  can  take  epistemic  responsibility  for  its  outcomes,  even  if   its  operation  is  entirely  
automatic  and  unreflective.    
As  noted  in  the  previous  section,   this   is   (i)  either  because  the  agent  can  at   least  
become   counterfactually   aware   of   any   signs   of   unreliability   and   thereby   choose   to  
consciously  respond  appropriately  should  there  be  anything  wrong  (even  though,  when  
everything  goes  well,   the  agent  does  not  need  to  exercise  any  conscious  control  at   the  
time   of   forming   her   beliefs),   (ii)   because   the   agent   has,   in   the   past,   been   consciously  
involved  in  the  epistemic  engineering  of  the  belief-­‐‑forming  processes  that  automatically  
generate   her   beliefs   (even   though   at   the  moment   of   forming   her   beliefs   she   needs   to  
have  no  factual  or  counterfactual  awareness  of  their  reliability),  or  possibly  (iii)  because  
of  both  (i)  and  (ii).  The  common  denominator  behind  all  these  minimalist  approaches  to  
epistemic  responsibility,  ownership  and  overall  hygiene  is  that  they  all  account  for  the  
indispensable   epistemic   requirement   that   the   agent’s   belief-­‐‑forming   processes   be  
responsive  to  their  own  contextual  reliability,  and  in  all  cases  this  responsiveness  arises  
out  of  the  integrated  nature  of  the  agent’s  cognitive  system  as  a  whole.  Granted,  this  is  a  
minimalist   way   to   understand   ownership—and   thereby   responsibility—of   a   belief  
forming  process,  but   it   seems   to   be   the   same  kind   of   responsibility   that   is  minimally  
required  in  order  to  acquire  knowledge  on  the  basis  of  our  bedrock  biological  resources.    
For  example,   it   is  possible  to  use  the  above  approach  in  order  to  explain  how  a  
subject  might  come  to  perceive   the  world  on   the  basis  of  a  Tactile  Visual  Substitution  
System  (TVSS),  while  also  holding  fast  to  the  idea  that  knowledge  is  belief  that  is  true  in  
virtue  of  cognitive  ability  (i.e.  the  ability  intuition  on  knowledge).  Briefly,  a  tactile  visual  
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substitution  system  is  a  mini  video  camera  attached  on  a  pair  of  glasses,  which  converts  
the  visual   input   into   tactile   stimulation  under   the   agent’s   tongue  or  her   forehead.  By  
moving   around  and  on   the  basis   of   the   associated   sensorimotor   contingencies,15  blind  
patients   quickly   start   perceiving   shapes   and   objects   and   orient   themselves   in   space.  
Occasionally,  they  also  offer  reports  of  feeling  as  if  they  are  seeing  the  objects,  indicating  
that  they  are  enjoying  phenomenal  qualities  that  are  close  to  those  of  the  original  sense  
modality  that  is  being  substituted.  Seeing  through  a  TVSS  qualifies,  in  the  light  of  DST,  
as  a  case  of  cognitive  extension,  because  it  is  a  dynamical  process  that  involves  ongoing  
reciprocal   interactions   between   the   agent   and   the   artifact.16  By   moving   around,   the  
agent  affects  the  input  of  the  mini-­‐‑video  camera,  which  continuously  affects  the  tactile  
stimulation   she   will   receive   on   her   tongue   or   forehead   by   the   TVSS,   which   then  
continuously  affects  how  she  will  move  around  and  so  on.  Eventually,  as   the  process  
                                                
15 For a full account of how sensorimotor knowledge is constitutive of perception see (Noë 2004). “The 
basic claim of the enactive approach is that the perceiver’s ability to perceive is constituted (in part) by 
sensorimotor knowledge (i.e. by practical grasp of the way sensory stimulation varies as the perceiver 
moves)”. (Noë 2004, 12). “What the perception is, however, is not a process in the brain, but a kind of 
skilful activity on the part of the animal as a whole”. (Noë 2004, 2). “Perception is not something that 
happens to us or in us, it is something we do”. (Noë 2004, 1). Sensorimotor dependencies are relations 
between movements or change and sensory stimulation. It is the practical knowledge of loops relating 
external objects and their properties with recurring patterns of change in sensory stimulation. These 
patterns of change may be caused by the moving subject, the moving object, the ambient environment 
(changes in illumination) and so on. 
16 One possible worry is that ongoing mutual interactions may not be sufficient for cognitive extension. 
Instead, general availability of the external resource might also be crucial in the same way that our 
biological cognitive resources are readily available almost anywhere we go. Indicatively, Wilson and 
Clark (2005) consider the possibility of TECS—transient extended cognitive systems—but they treat them 
in a rather sceptical manner, “for we properly expect our individual agents to be mobile, more-or-less 
reliable, bundles of stored knowledge and computational, emotional, and inferential capacities, and so we 
need to be persuaded that the new capacities enabled by the addition of the notebook are likewise 
sufficiently robust and enduring as to contribute to the persisting cognitive profile we identify as [the 
agent].” While it is true that general availability seems to play an important role when we intuitively 
judge whether a specific case of tool-employment should qualify as a case of cognitive extension it is not 
entirely clear that it is a necessary condition on cognitive extension or that it is a condition that should be 
thought in relation to the relevant organismic agent. Using pen and paper to solve a mathematical 
problem probably qualifies as a case of cognitive extension even if most of us do not normally carry a pen 
and paper around everywhere we go. Similarly, our biological cognitive resources might be generally 
available to us but not all the time; for example our visual perceptual capacities are unavailable whenever 
lighting conditions are low. It might therefore be possible that general availability is a background 
condition pertaining to the environment that the agent is normally embedded in (for example that 
normally it is easy to get hold of pen and paper or that lighting conditions are most of the time sufficient 
for visual perception) rather than a condition on the agent-artifact system itself.   
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unfolds,  the  coupled  system  of  the  agent  and  her  TVSS  is  able  to  identify—that  is,  see—
shapes  and  objects  in  space.    
Seen   from   the   perspective   of   virtue   reliabilism,   the   belief-­‐‑forming   process   in  
virtue  of  which  the  subject  believes  the  truth  with  regards  to  the  space  surrounding  her  
might   indeed  be   for   the  most  part   external   to  her  organismic   cognitive  agency,  but   it  
still  counts  as  one  of  her  cognitive  abilities,  as  it  has  been  appropriately  integrated  into  
her   cognitive   character.   It   is   the   ongoing   interplay   between   the   agent’s   organismic  
cognitive  faculties  and  the  working  of  the  external  component  that  is  responsible  for  the  
recruitment,   sustaining,   and   monitoring   of   the   extended   belief-­‐‑forming   process   (i.e.,  
quasi-­‐‑visual  perception),  in  virtue  of  which  the  truth  with  respect  to  shapes  and  objects  
in  space  is  eventually  arrived  at  in  a  reliable  fashion.  
  
5.  The  extended  knower:  ethical  implications    
With   the   initial  dilemma  of   epistemic  hygiene   finally   resolved,   the  possibility   of  bona  
fide   extended   knowers   has   now  been   established.   In  what   follows,   the   aim  will   be   to  
look  beyond  the  epistemology  of  ‘new  humans’,  by  examining  in  some  detail  the  kind  
of   ‘extended   ethics’   that   would   characterize   the   extended   knower   (in   the   sense  
described   in   §§1-­‐‑4).   Consider   that,   at   a   high   level   of   abstraction,  what  we   should   do  
often   depends      both   on   what   we   know   and   on   what   we’re   capable   of   finding   out.  
Extended  knowing,  in  contrast  with  traditional  intracranial  knowing,  represents  a  shift  in  
both  the  breadth  of   the   information  base  we’re  capable  of  commanding  as  well  as   the  
comparative  ease  by  which  new  knowledge  can  be  acquired,  e.g.,   through  responsible  
use  of  cyborg/extended-­‐‑mind  technologies.    It  should  not  be  surprising,  then,  if  certain  
aspects  of  our  ethical  and  legal  thinking  that  depend  upon    what  we  know  and  what  we  
know  how  to  know    should  require  some  updating.      
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   In  this  section,  we  will  suggest  three  concrete  ways  in  which  extended  knowing  
gives   rise   to   new   ethical   and   legal   challenges:   specifically,   these   concern   (i)   expertise  
and  ethical  obligations;  (ii)  privacy;  and  (iii)  responsibility.17  We  consider  each  in  turn.  
  
5.1  Expertise  and  Ethical  obligation  
Here  is  a  very  intuitive  principle:  ceteris  paribus,  if  you  do  not  know  how  to  φ,  you  are  
not  obligated  to  φ.  You  can’t  be  obligated  to  prove  the  Riemann  Hypothesis  if  you  failed  
high  school  math.  The  converse,  of  course,  is  false:  knowing  how  to  φ  is  not  sufficient  for  
generating   an   obligation   to   φ.   You  might   know   how   to   build   a   bomb;   that   does   not  
mean   you   should.   However,   the   possession   of   the   right   kind   of   knowledge   can,   as  
Vanessa   Carbonell   (2013)   puts   it,   ‘trigger’   ethical   obligations,   under   certain  
circumstances  where   other   conditions   for   ethical   obligation   are   already   satisfied.  Call  
this  the  ‘triggering  principle’:  
Triggering  Principle:  knowledge  “triggers”  obligation  when  it  provides  one  of  the  
necessary  and  jointly  sufficient  conditions  for  obligation—specifically,  when  it  is  
either  the  last  (temporally)  of  the  conditions  to  obtain,  or  when  it  is  the  condition  
that  sets  a  given  agent  apart  from  some  comparison  class  (2013,  246).  
Especially   interesting   for   our   purposes   will   be   the   latter   kinds   of   cases,   where  
knowledge  possession   triggers   an  ethical  obligation  by   setting   the  agent   apart   from  a  
comparison   class,   namely,   individuals   who   lack   the   relevant   knowledge.   Carbonell  
offers  a  helpful  illustrative  case,  which  we  can  use  as  our  reference  point:    
…[S]uppose  a  man  collapses  on  the  railway  platform  and  is  dying  while  waiting  
for   the  paramedics.  As   the  sole  bystander   I  would  be  obligated   to  save  his   life,  
                                                
17  A further important implication of extended epistemology for ethics and law concerns the legal 
definition of assault. Of particular relevance is that the intentional compromising of an individual’s 
faculties or powers is ordinarily conceived of as a kind of personal harm distinct from (say) merely 
damaging that individual’s property. However, if we leave the intracranial picture of the mind behind, 
there is room to consider cases where an individual’s faculties are intentionally compromised by the 
causing of harm or damage to the extra-organismic material realisers of such faculties. For discussion on 
this point, see Carter & Palermos (Forthcoming).  
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but   I   do   not   know   how.   (Fortunately,   the   paramedics   arrive   just   in   time.)  
Coincidentally,  a  CPR  course  is  offered  at  my  workplace  that  day,  and  I  take  it.  
On   my   return   commute,   shockingly,   another   man   collapses   on   the   railway  
platform.  No  one  else  on  the  platform  has  the  relevant  knowledge,  but  now  I  do.  
A  knowledge-­‐‑based  obligation  has  been  triggered  (2013,  247).  
In  this  case,  on  the  return  trip  home  (after  taking  the  CPR  class),  what  triggered  
the  obligation  was  simply  knowing  the  steps  to  perform  CPR  to  save  a  life.  In  the  above  
example,   the   knowledge   in   question   is   presumably   stored   in   bio-­‐‑memory,  which   the  
individual  in  question  can  easily  recall  (having  just  learnt  the  information).    
Contrast   now   the   above   case,  where   the   triggering   principle   kicks   in,  with   an  
‘extended  variation’  on  the  case.  Let’s  tweak  the  details  of  Carbonell’s  scenario  so  that  
the  subject  in  question—let’s  call  her  C.P.—never  took  the  CPR  class  that  day.  However,  
suppose  the  she  instead  simply  purchased  and  downloaded  the  ‘CPR  Tempo18’  app  for  
her  iPhone,  which  offers  both  audio  as  well  as  visual  cues  that  aid  the  timing  of  chest  
compressions  during  the  process  of  cardiopulmonary  resuscitation  (CPR).  According  to  
the  American  Heart  Association,  approximately  100  to  120  compressions  per  minute  are  
required   in   order   to   administer   CPR   effectively.19  Let’s   suppose   that   C.P.   appreciates  
that,   but   given   that   she  never   took   the   class,   she  would  be  hopeless   at   administering  
CPR  without  the  audio  and  visual  timing  cues  of  the  CPR  Tempo  app.    
Let’s   continue   our   variation   on   Carbonell’s   case;   in   particular,   let’s   hold   fixed  
that   no   one   on   the   train   platform   (other   than   C.P.,   whose   phone   now   has   the   CPR  
Tempo   app   installed)   has   any   clue   about   CPR   performance.      With   reference   to   the  
triggering   principle,   it   looks   as   though   C.P.,   despite   lacking   any   relevant   information  
about   CPR   in   bio-­‐‑memory,   nonetheless   now   has   a   knowledge-­‐‑based   obligation   she  
would  otherwise   lack.  Specifically,   this   is  an  obligation   that  becomes   triggered  by  her  
                                                
18 https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/cpr-tempo/id525695057?mt=8 
19  These are the updated guidelines since 2015, prior to which the suggested number was 100. 
http://news.heart.org/%EF%BB%BFnew-resuscitation-guidelines-update-cpr-chest-pushes/ 
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having   integrated   (and   let’s   suppose,   she   practiced   using   it   several   times   after  
downloading)  the  CPR  Tempo  app  into  an  iPhone  she’s  already  very  fluent  with.    
If   the   foregoing  diagnosis   is   right,   then   it   looks  very  much  as   though  extended  
knowers   will,   on   the   whole   (and   abstracting   now   from   the   particular   CPR   case),   be  
more  likely  to  satisfy  epistemic  triggering  conditions  on  various  kinds  of  obligations—
obligations   they   would   fail   to   have   in   the   absence   of   cyborg/   extended-­‐‑mind  
technologies.      This   is,  we   think,   the   right   conclusion   to   draw,   and   it   is   an   important  
ethical  consequence  of  extended  knowing.    
Consider,   however,   one   kind   of   anticipated   objection,   according   to   which   our  
diagnosis  of  the  case  of  C.P.  implausibly  overgeneralises:  ‘C.P.,  in  this  redescribed  case,  
merely   knows  how   to   find   out   how   to  do  CPR  properly.   But,   there   is   a   sense   in  which  
everyone  else  on  the  platform  also  knows  how  to  find  out  how  to  do  CPR  (i.e.,  by  asking  
an  expert,  looking  it  up,  downloading  the  CPR  Tempo  app  themselves,  etc.).  Thus,  the  
fact   that   C.P.   knows   how   to   find   out   how   to   do  CPR  does   not   set   her   apart   from   the  
comparison   class   that   is   the   other   individuals   on   the   platform.   And   therefore,   the  
obligation  is  not  triggered.’  
In   reply,   consider   that   the   kind   of   knowledge   that   is   plausibly   relevant   to   the  
triggering   principle   is   actionable   knowledge   in   the   context   of   the   obligation,   that   is,  
knowledge  that  can  be  promptly  put  to  use.  If  someone—call  her  Mnemony—possessed  
all  the  CPR-­‐‑relevant  information  in  bio-­‐‑memory,  but  before  putting  it  to  use  had  to  first  
recite  35  detailed  and  extremely  slow  mnemonic  devices  (all  stored  in  bio-­‐‑memory),  her  
knowledge  would  not  count  as  actionable  knowledge.  And  this   is   the  case  even   if  we  
insist   that   Mnemony   does   know   how   to   perform   CPR,   but   has   to   slowly   and  
painstakingly   work   through   her   mnemonic   devices   first.   In   our   variation   on  
Carbonelle’s   case,  C.P.  plausibly  has   an  obligation   triggered   that  Mnemony  does  not,  
despite  Mnemony’s  possessing  the  relevant  knowledge.    
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Furher   complexities   could   ensue   if   others   present   had   even   faster   and   more  
powerful  devices  and  greater  expertise  at  following  newly  downloaded  instructions.  In  
such  an  instance,  it  could  be  that  one  of  the  ‘merely  potential’  extended  knowers—the  
ones  who   could,   if   they  wished,   download   the   app   and   apply   the   lessons   rapidly—
might  have  the  strongest  obligation  to  step  in!  20  
Given   increased   cognitive   offloading   and   seamless   integration   with   iPhones,  
Satnavs,   smartwatches   and   the   like,   ‘lack   of   knowledge’—as   an   exculpatory   factor   in  
cases  where  other  conditions  for  ethical  obligations  are  met,  will  plausibly  become  less  
common.      In   situations   where   an   individual   is   in   need   and   several   bystanders   have  
smartphones,   the   condition   that   sets   a  given  agent  apart   from  some  comparison  class  
(and  thus  triggers  the  knowledge-­‐‑based  obligation)  might  well  come  down  to  fluency  of  




Your  thoughts  are  your  own.  As  soon  as  someone  tries  to  take  them  from  you  (imagine:  
your  private  thoughts  are  broadcast  for  millions  to  see)  you  are,  in  an  important  sense,  
less  free  and  autonomous—or  at  the  very  least,  more  pragmatically  constrained—than  
you  were  before.  As  Michael  P.  Lynch  (2013)  puts  it:  
                                                
20 All   these   cases   hide   a   complication,  which   is   that   they   implicitly   assume   that   all   agents   present   can  
rapidly   determine   their   relative   epistemic   status   compared   to   all   the   other   agents   present,   so   that   it   is  
immediately  clear  to  the  ‘fastest,  best’  agent  that  she  has  prime  responsibility  to  act.  This  was  relatively  
easy  in  the  case  of  comparing  bio-­‐‑knowers  (“is  there  a  doctor  or  a  para-­‐‑medic  on  the  train?”)    but  our  self-­‐‑
assessments  of  what  we  could  come  to  know,  and  how  easily,  and  with  what  reliability,  are  plausibly  far  






to   be   an   autonomous  person   is   to   be   capable   of   having  privileged   access  …   to  
information   about  your  psychological  profile—your  hopes,  dreams,   beliefs   and  
fears.  A  capacity  for  privacy  is  a  necessary  condition  of  autonomous  personhood.  
How   safe   are   the   contents   of   your   mind?   Recent   revelations   of   the   extent   of  
governments’   access   to   Big   Data   has   made   salient   one   glaring   way   that   our   private  
lives,   as   expressed   online   through   revealed   preferences   and   social   media,   are   not   as  
private   as   we   thought.21  Nowadays,   this   overarching   threat   to   online   privacy,   in   the  
name  of  public  safety,  is  a  heated  point  of  political  debate.22      
However,  there  is  a  much  subtler  way  in  which  extended  knowers  stand  to  have  
their   privacy   compromised  by   laws  which  presuppose   that   our  private   lives   are—for  
legal  purposes,  at  least—in  our  heads.  Here  it  will  be  helpful  to  briefly  review  the  2014  
landmark  U.S.  Supreme  court  ruling   in  Riley  v.  California,  a  case   in  which  a  California  
citizen’s   phone   was   searched,   without   a   warrant,   during   the   course   of   an   arrest  
following  a  traffic  stop.23    
The  lower  courts  which  ruled  in  Riley  v.  California  regarded  the  arresting  officer’s  
search  to  be  lawful,  because  arresting  police  officers  are  allowed  to  perform,  without  a  
warrant,   search   of   an   arrested   person’s   physical   area,   which   is   defined   as   the   area  
within   the  person’s  physical   control.  This   legal  precedent   in   the  U.S.   is   called   ‘Search  
Incident   to  Arrest’   (SITA),  also  known  as   the  Chimel   rule.24  Riley’s  mobile  phone  was  
within  the  area  of  his  physical  control  at  the  time  of  arrest,  and  so  was  deemed  within  
the   bounds   of   what   could   be   permissibly   searched  without   a   warrant.   Incriminating  
                                                
21Examples here include the FBI web surveillance system Carnivore which samples non-suspect internet 
communication, and the Echelon global satellite network. See DeCew (2013) for a philosophical 
overview[§4]. See also http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/20/little-privacy-in-the-
age-of-big-data. 
22 For discussion on the ‘privacy/security’ trade off in EU politics, see Mortera-Martinez (2015).  
 
23  For the U.S. Supreme Court opinion, see http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-




evidence  was  subsequently  found  on  the  phone,  and  because  the  lower  courts  regarded  
the  search  to  be  lawful,  this  evidence  was  allowed  to  be  used  against  Riley.  
  It   should  not  be   surprising   that   in   the  United  States,   the  Chimel   rule  does  not  
permit  a  warrantless  search  of  an   individual’s  physical   interior  (i.e.,  an  investigation  of  
the  contents  of  one’s  leg,  arm,  or  brain).  Nor  does  the  Chimel  rule  permit  the  arresting  
officer   to  administer  on-­‐‑the-­‐‑scene  sodium  thiopental   (i.e.,   truth-­‐‑serum),   in  an  effort   to  
somehow  extract  ‘thoughts’  without  a  warrant.    
Problematically,   though,   for   extended   knowers,   warrantless   searching   of   a  
mobile  phone  (whether  it  is  within  the  individual’s  physical  area  or  not)  is  effectively  a  
warrantless   invasion   of   the  mind,   a   point   the   Chimel   rule   glosses   over   by   regarding  
physical   objects   in   the   arrested   individual’s   area   of   control   to   be   on   an   equal   footing  
with  respect  to  privacy.    
Fortunately,   laws   are   beginning   to   catch   up   (albeit   slowly). 25   In   2014,   the  
Supreme  Court  unanimously  overturned  the   lower  courts’   rulings,  and   insisted  that  a  
mobile  phone  should  be  treated  as  relevantly  different  from  other  physical  objects  in  the  
individual’s  areas  of  immediate  control,  and  that  as  such  should  be  exempt  from  what  
can  be  searched  without  a  warrant.  Chief   Justice   John  Roberts,   in  his  written  majority  
opinion   of   the  Court,   unsurprisingly   did   not   include   any   explicit   commitment   to   the  
bounds   of   cognition   in   the   course   of   his   rationale.   But   by   way   of   an   analogy   that  
featured  in  the  majority  opinion,  the  legal  rationale  did  come  close:      
‘[…]  modern  cell  phones  .  .  .  are  now  such  a  pervasive  and  insistent  part  of  daily  
life  that  the  proverbial  visitor  from  Mars  might  conclude  they  were  an  important  
feature  of  human  anatomy’.    
The   ruling   in  Riley  v.  California   is   a   step   in   the   right  direction.  However,  many  
privacy   laws  remain   tacitly  wedded  to   the  old   intracranial  picture  of  our  mental   lives  
                                                
25  For  an  extensive  treatment  of  how  the  extended  cognition  hypothesis  can  impact  on  the  law  see  Carter  
and  Palermos  (Forthcoming).    
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and   the   legal   reasoning   about   privacy   that   falls   out   of   it;26  the   need   for   further   legal  
updates   remains   urgent.   After   all,   as   an   expert   panel   at   the   Pew   Research   Centre  
predicts,  in  less  than  10  years  (i.e.,  by  the  year  2025),  we  will  live  in  an  
  ‘environment   where   accessing   the   Internet   will   be   effortless   and  most   people  
will   tap   into   it   so   easily   it   will   flow   through   their   lives   “like   electricity.”’   […]  
mobile,  wearable,  and  embedded  computing  will  be  tied  together  in  the  Internet  
of   Things,   allowing   people   and   their   surroundings   to   tap   into   artificial  
intelligence-­‐‑enhanced  cloud-­‐‑based  information  storage  and  sharing.27  
  
5.3  Collective  responsibility  in  cases  of  distributed  cognition  and  Social  Machines  like  Wikipedia.  
Distributed   cognition,   as   noted   before,   takes   place   when   two   or   more   individuals  
engage   in   reciprocal   interactions   in   order   to   solve   some   cognitive   task   (Palermos  
Forthcominga).   Perhaps   the   most   well   studied   distributed   cognitive   systems   are  
Transactive   Memory   Systems   where   two   or   more   individuals   collaboratively   store,  
encode  and  retrieve  information,  thereby  forming  a  collective  memory  system  much  in  
the   same   way   that   you   and   your   memory   app   would   (Wegner   1987).   The   idea   of  
distributed  cognition,  however,  has  also  started  gaining   traction  within  philosophy  of  
science,  and  especially  with  reference  to  scientific  research  teams  (Giere  2002,  Palermos  
2015),   and   it   is   particularly   amenable   (though   so   far   largely   underexplored)   to  Web  
science   (Palermos   Forthcominga),   and   especially   the   case   of   Social  Machines,   such   as  
Wikipedia—i.e.,  processes   in  which   the  people  do   the   creative  work  and   the  machine  
does   the   administration   (Berners-­‐‑Lee   et   al   2002,   172)   and   which   will   enable   to   “do  
things  we  just  couldn’t  do  before”  (Berners-­‐‑Lee  et  al.  2002,  174).    
                                                
26 This is especially the case as concerns a British cyborg Neil Harbisson, whose ‘Eyeborg’ device, which 




One  of   the  most   interesting  questions  concerning  distributed  cognitive   systems  
and  Social  Machines  is  the  issue  of  responsibility  and  attribution  of  credit.  Given  that  in  
such  cases  the  cognitive  task  is  performed  by  the  cognitive  system  as  a  whole,  it  would  
seem—contrary   to   standard   practice—wrong,   or   unfair,   to   attribute   the   credit   (or  
blame)  to  any  individual  alone,  or  even  to  a  subset  of  them):  The  final  product  arises  out  
of  dense  processes  of  interaction  between  the  members  of  the  relevant  group,  such  that  
it  may  be    impossible  to  isolate  how  the  efforts  of  any  given  agent  was  involved.    
Consider  for  example  the  case  of  English  Wikipedia,  which  according  to  a  recent  
study  is  almost  as  equally  reliable  as  Encyclopedia  Britannica  (Giles  2005).28  Contrary  to  
Britannica,   however,   which   assigns   the   authorship   of   its   entries   to   well-­‐‑qualified  
contributors   that  work   in   isolation,   the   reliability   of   English  Wikipedia   is   a   collective  
variable  that  is  the  product  of  the  ‘power  of  the  many  eyes’  (Noveck,  2007).  In  order  to  
grow  fast  in  as  many  directions  as  possible,  Wikipedia  has  always  operated  on  a  policy  
of  free  editability,  according  to  which  anyone  can  edit  without  providing  any  epistemic  
credentials.   Given,   however,   that   anyone   can   edit,   Wikipedia   has   drawn   the   caring  
attention  of  a  huge  volume  of  contributors  such  that  anytime  a  mistake  is  spotted  it  gets  
almost   immediately  corrected.   In   this  way,   the  probability   that  any  given   information  
currently   posted   online   is   reliable   becomes   high,   and   this   ongoing   reliability   is   a  
collective  property  in  the  sense  that  it  does  not  arise  from  any  individual’s  expertise  or  
credentials.   Instead,   it   emerges   from   the   co-­‐‑operative   activity   of   all   the   individual  
members,   much   in   the   same   way   that   the   interconnectedness   of   our   individual  
cognitive   systems  makes   it   possible   to   detect   cognitive   shortcomings   as   soon   as   they  
occur  and  respond  appropriately.29    
                                                
28 At least with respect to a wide range of scientific topics. See also encyclopaedia Britannica’s response 
(http://corporate.britannica.com/britannica_nature_response.pdf) and Nature’s counter response 
(http://www.nature.com/press_releases/Britannica_response.pdf).  
 
29  For  a  detailed  account  of  Wikipedia  as  a  distributed  epistemic  agent  see  (Palermos  Forthcomingb).    
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Indicatively,  notice  that  even  if  a  single  individual  intentionally  posts  a  falsehood  
that  somehow  remains  online  long  enough  for  others  to  (mis)  use  it  ,  it  would  be  subtly  
misleading  to   lay  all   the  blame  on  the   individual  who  posted  the   false   information.   It  
would   be   misleading   because   Wikipedia’s   reliability,   as   we   saw,   does   not   originate  
from   the   reliability   of   the   source   of   the   information   but   from   the   community’s  well-­‐‑
developed   capacity   to   check   and   correct   any   information   that   is   posted.   So   when  
unreliable   information   remains   online   long   enough   to   cause   serious   issues,      this   is   a  
failing  of  the    Social  Machine  as  a  whole.    
Wikipedia  is  an  example  that  we  all  happen  to  be  familiar  with.  But    the  advent  
of  the  Social  Web  and  the  increasing  use  of  knowledge  management  systems  suggests  
that  these  issues  concerning  collective  responsibility  will  become  increasingly  important  
as  we  shape  and  are  shaped  by  a  seamlessly  interconnected  world.30      
  
Conclusions    
One  of   the   characteristics  of   the  most  powerful   emerging   technologies   is   their   almost  
invisible  nature:  Fast  automated  information-­‐‑retrieval  can  deliver  reliable  outputs  much  
in   the   same   way   that   our   onboard   cognitive   capacities   of   bio-­‐‑memory   and   bio-­‐‑
perception  do.  To  ensure  that  these  devices  behave  like  parts  of  us,  rather  than  opaque  
outside  forces,  we  need  to  ensure  that  they  become  cognitively  integrated    in  the  many  
ways  we  have  outlined.  Such  integration  may  be  brought  about  by  an  ongoing  series  of  
reciprocal  interactions  that  result  in  the  correct  (automatic)  estimation  of  their  context-­‐‑
variable   reliability.   However   it   is   achieved,   cognitive   integration   ensures   that   these  
technologically   augmented      ‘new   humans’   can   count   as   knowing   and   epistemically  
responsible  agents.  Technological  extensions  of  this  integrated  sort  radically  transform  
what  we  know.  But  such  a  reconceptualization  of  our  knowledge  capacities  demands  an  
                                                
30  For  a  detailed  treatment  of  the  general  topic  of  the  distribution  of  epistemic  agency,  see  Palermos  and  
Pritchard  (Forthcoming).      
 28 
accompanying   reconceptualization  of  our  human  nature,      our   ethical  obligations,   and  
our  personal  rights  and  duties.    
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